Consolidation in an individual transferable quota regime: lessons from New Zealand, 1986-1999.
Market-based approaches to environmental regulation (such as tradable permits or transferable quotas) are frequently offered as innovative solutions to many environmental problems. Globally, one of the most well-established forms of this approach is individual transferable quotas (or ITQs) in fisheries management. Within the natural resource management community, there is considerable debate over the effects ITQs have on the fishing industry and fisher behavior although this approach is not well-established in the United States. The previously imposed moratorium on ITQs in the United States has expired and the 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act explicitly provides for limited access privileges (LAPs). A variety of fishers, regulators, and conservation organizations are enthusiastically seeking to introduce ITQ management. With debate over whether and how ITQs should be used in American fisheries reinvigorated, it is timely to examine the evidence on the social and economic effects of ITQs in other nations' fisheries. After briefly summarizing the debate on ITQs, we examine the case of New Zealand, one of the earliest and longest-lived ITQ-based fisheries regimes. We use multiple data sources and methods to analyze the extent to which industry consolidation and aggregation has occurred, including surveys of industry participants, expert interviews, reviews of academic reports and analyses, analysis of trade publications, and direct analysis of quota ownership patterns. This analysis shows a more complex outcome than recent debates in the ITQ literature would predict. These findings suggest that policy makers considering ITQs can learn from the experiences of other countries related to key issues such as quota allocation, aggregation limits, transferability, cost recovery, and resource sustainability when designing ITQ and other LAP systems. It is also important to explicitly identify economic and social objectives and then carefully design ITQ regimes to meet these objectives.